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Abstract
I quantify the price eﬀect of a low-cost entrant on retail prices using a case-study
approach. I consider the eﬀect of Wal-Mart entry on average city-level prices of
various consumer goods by exploiting variation in the timing of store entry. The
analysis combines two unique data sets, one containing opening dates of all US
Wal-Mart stores and the other containing average quarterly retail prices of several
narrowly-deﬁned commonly-purchased goods over the period 1982-2002. I focus on
10 speciﬁc items likely to be sold at Wal-Mart stores and analyze their price dy-
namics in 165 US cities before and after Wal-Mart entry. An instrumental-variables
speciﬁcation corrects for measurement error in Wal-Mart entry dates. I ﬁnd robust
price eﬀects for several products, including shampoo, toothpaste, and laundry de-
tergent; magnitudes vary by product and speciﬁcation, but generally range from
1.5-3% in the short run and four times as much in the long-run.
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for research assistance. All remaining errors are my own.“Wal-Mart’s mania for selling goods at rock-bottom prices has trained consumers to
expect deep discounts everywhere they shop, forcing competing retailers to follow
suit or fall behind.”
– Washington Post, November 6, 2003
“Even if you don’t shop at Wal-Mart, the retail powerhouse increasingly is dic-
tating your product choices – and what you pay – as its relentless price cutting
helps keep inﬂation low.”
– USA Today, January 29, 2003
1 Introduction
In most models of imperfect competition, entry of a lower-cost competitor reduces output
prices. The eﬀect is larger the smaller the initial number of ﬁrms and the higher are cross-price
elasticities of demand. In this paper, I quantify the price eﬀect of a low-cost entrant on retail
markets using a case study of Wal-Mart entry, and show that Wal-Mart’s price impact can be
quite large. The analysis combines data on the opening dates of all US Wal-Mart stores with
average city-level retail prices of several narrowly-deﬁned commonly-purchased goods over the
period 1982-2002. I focus on 10 speciﬁc items likely to be sold at Wal-Mart stores and analyze
their price dynamics in 165 US cities before and after Wal-Mart entry. I ﬁnd price declines of
1.5%-3% for many products in the short run, with the largest price eﬀects occurring for aspirin,
laundry detergent, toothpaste and shampoo. Long-run price declines tend to be much larger,
and in some speciﬁcations range from 7-13%. These eﬀects are driven mostly by relatively small
cities, which have high ratios of retail establishments to population.
Wal-Mart’s low labor costs and the retail chain’s logistics and distribution innovations make
it the prototypical low-cost entrant. Broadly, there are two mechanisms by which Wal-Mart’s
expansion could have aﬀected retail prices and consumer inﬂation rates: an aggregate mecha-
nism and a market-speciﬁc mechanism. The aggregate mechanism works through Wal-Mart’s
interactions with both suppliers (manufacturers and importers) and other large retail chains.
This mechanism can lower prices in communities not served by Wal-Mart if it leads to lower
costs for other retailers.1 The market-speciﬁc mechanism works through competition (and
1The argument for this mechanism is as follows. By demanding lower prices from suppliers, Wal-Mart forces
manufacturers to cut costs, possibly by relocating overseas. Competing retail chains (notably Target, but also
many smaller chains) also increase eﬃciency by emulating Wal-Mart’s innovations in logistics and distribution
(McKinsey Global Institute [22]). The result is lower prices in chain stores across the country, some in locations
that have no Wal-Mart stores.
1possibly learning) at the local level.
The focus of this paper is on the second mechanism. Wal-Mart’s entry into a given market
(city or town) can lower prices by increasing the competitive pressure incumbents (and future
entrants) face. This is the prediction of most standard imperfect-competition models, such as
diﬀerentiated-product Bertrand competition and a spatial-competition model, and also of many
models with equilibrium price dispersion (such as Reinganum [25]).2
Although these theories make consistent predictions about the price impact of entry, very
little empirical work has been done to quantify these eﬀects. I test these predictions on average
prices of 10 speciﬁc goods such as toothpaste, Coke, and jeans, by exploiting exogenous variation
in the timing of store entry in diﬀerent markets. I combine two unique data sources on Wal-
Mart store locations and retail prices in 165 US cities over a 20-year period, 1982-2002. The
Wal-Mart data include store locations and opening dates of all U.S. Wal-Mart stores. Price data
from the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association (ACCRA) consist of average
retail prices of 10 products across multiple establishments in each city.
The methodology follows Basker [3], which examines the employment eﬀects of Wal-Mart
entry, with two innovations. In Basker [3], I consider the eﬀect of Wal-Mart entry on county-
level employment in the retail and wholesale sectors, using 1749 counties (slightly more than
half of all US counties). Because price data are available at the city (or town) level, rather than
the county level, I disaggregate the Wal-Mart data to the city level for this study. In addition,
because price data are collected quarterly, I perform the analysis using quarterly, rather than
annual, data.
I deﬁne the “eﬀect” of Wal-Mart entry broadly. For example, if Wal-Mart entry induces the
exit of an incumbent drugstore, the long-run price eﬀect I isolate combines the eﬀect of both
the entry and the exit. By estimating separate short- and long-run price eﬀects, I attempt to
separate these issues. If Wal-Mart entry spurs other entries or leads to increased diﬀerentiation
among incumbents, this too is incorporated in the net eﬀect.
I ﬁnd that the price eﬀect of Wal-Mart entry diﬀers by product and city size. For several
products, including toothpaste, shampoo, aspirin, and laundry detergent, Wal-Mart entry re-
duces average retail prices by an economically large and statistically signiﬁcant 7-13% in the
long run. These results have real implications: if the market basket of low-income shoppers
2The products whose prices I consider are homogeneous, but the shopping experience, including location and
service, may be better described as diﬀerentiated.
2declined by this full amount, the income eﬀects could be very large. Results are driven by
Wal-Mart’s eﬀects in smaller cities, with more retail establishments per capita, where retail
establishments tend to be smaller and the retail environment is less competitive.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background infor-
mation on Wal-Mart. Section 3 describes the data. The empirical methodology is outlined in
Section 4, and results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the
magnitude of the price eﬀect and its implications.
2 Wal-Mart Background
The ﬁrst Wal-Mart store opened in Rogers, Arkansas in 1962. By the time the company be-
came publicly traded in 1969 it had 18 stores throughout Arkansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma.
Wal-Mart slowly expanded its geographical reach, building new stores and accompanying dis-
tribution centers further and further away from its original location, and continued, at the same
time, to build new stores in areas already serviced. Figure 1 shows maps of the 48 contiguous
states with locations of Wal-Mart stores over time (in 1982, 1993 and 2002) to illustrate this
point. In the beginning of the period, Wal-Mart’s sales accounted for approximately 0.2% of
all US retail sales; by the end of it, Wal-Mart had approximately 2900 stores in all 50 states
and about 800,000 employees in the United States, and accounted for approximately 5% of all
US retail sales.
Wal-Mart is extremely eﬃcient even compared with other “big-box” retailers. Lehman
Brothers analysts have noted Wal-Mart’s “leading logistics and information competencies”
(Feiner [12]). The Financial Times has called Wal-Mart “an operation whose eﬃciency is
the envy of the world’s storekeepers” (Edgecliﬀe-Johnson [11]). Wal-Mart’s competitive edge is
driven by a combination of conventional cost-cutting and sensitivity to demand conditions and
by superior logistics and distribution systems. The chain’s most-cited advantages over small
retailers are economies of scale and access to capital markets, whereas against other large retail
chains the most commonly cited factor is superior logistics, distribution, and inventory con-
trol.3 Employing exclusively non-union workers may be another source of cost-savings relative
to other retailers.4
3Details on Wal-Mart’s operations can be found in Harvard Business School’s three case studies about Wal-
Mart (Ghemawat [15], Foley and Mahmood [13], and Ghemawat and Friedman [16]).
4On the other hand, Wal-Mart is said to match the union wage in markets where it competes directly with
3Figure 1: Locations of Wal-Mart Stores, 1982, 1993, 2002
43 Data
To assess Wal-Mart’s eﬀect on retail prices, I combine data on the locations and opening dates
of Wal-Mart stores with retail price data.
3.1 Retail Prices
Retail prices are obtained from the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association. I
use quarterly prices of 10 products in 165 cities over 21 years, from 1982-2002.
The American Chamber of Commerce Research Association (ACCRA), through local Cam-
bers of Commerce, surveys 5-10 retail establishments in the ﬁrst week of each quarter in par-
ticipating cities. Participating cities vary from quarter to quarter, with some cities moving in
and out of the sample frequently, while others are included more regularly; 250-300 cities are
surveyed each quarter during the sample period. Of these, I selected the 165 cities for which
data from at least 50 quarters were available (including both current price and lagged price).
Each quarter between 100-140 cities are in the sample.
The prices collected by ACCRA cover approximately 50 goods and services. From the list
of items, I selected 10 goods that were homogeneous or nearly so, and likely to be sold at most
Wal-Mart stores (I exclude groceries and alcoholic beverages because most Wal-Mart stores
over the sample period do not include a grocery section). The selected products are listed in
Table 1. I begin my sample period in 1982 because most of these products were introduced into
the ACCRA price list in that year.5
While these data are the best available local price data that span such a long time-series as
well as cross-section of cities, covering speciﬁc prices, they have some drawbacks. One problem
is that the individual stores from which prices are collected cannot be identiﬁed; if they include
Wal-Mart stores, we will not be able to distinguish the direct impact of Wal-Mart (e.g., due to
charging lower prices than other stores) from the indirect impact, through competitive pressure,
on other stores. Somewhat mitigating this concern, the ACCRA manual urges its price collectors
nationwide to “[s]elect only grocery stores and apparel stores where professional and managerial
households normally shop. Even if discount stores are a majority of your overall market, they
unionized retailers (Saporito [26]).
5For some products, there is a change in the brand or/and size of the product during the time period, but since
quarter dummies will be controlled in the analyses below, changes in the price due to such shifts are accounted
for. We assume that the price response to Wal-Mart entry is the same across these alternatives.
5shouldn’t be in your sample at all unless upper-income professionals and executives really shop
there” (ACCRA [1], p. 1.3). If price surveyors follow this instruction, we may estimate a lower
bound of Wal-Mart’s impact, because Wal-Mart and its most direct competitors are unlikely to
be included.
Another potential problem is measurement error in prices. Measurement error may come
from several sources. The most likely are errors made by price surveyors in the tallying of
individual prices (e.g., copying prices incorrectly from store shelves); the average price reported
by ACCRA will be sensitive to such errors. This type of error is likely to be idiosyncratic,
uncorrelated over time or across products. Diﬀerences across cities or surveyors in the types
of establishments surveyed or the size of the geographic area covered may also be treated as
errors; these are less innocuous, because they are likely to be correlated over time within a city. I
discuss this issue and the problems it creates, along with possible remedies, in the methodology
section.
3.2 Wal-Mart Stores
The Wal-Mart store data are described in detail in Appendix 1 of Basker [3]. I brieﬂy review
the data sources.
I collected data on the locations and opening dates of 2,382 Wal-Mart stores in the United
States from Wal-Mart annual reports, Wal-Mart editions of Rand McNally Road Atlases and
annual editions of the Directory of Discount Department Stores.6 The available data include
store location (by city) and store number. Opening years of individual stores can be inferred
by comparing lists of existing stores from consecutive years.7 Table 2 (reproduced from Basker
[3]) summarizes these sources.8
From these lists, I create the indicator variable WMopenjt, which takes on the value of 1
if the directories and store lists suggest that a Wal-Mart store exists in city j in quarter t, and
zero otherwise. While this assignment is simple in the calendar years preceding or following
the year of entry, the exact quarter of entry is not known from these lists, so quarterly values
6Requests for store-opening data from Wal-Mart corporation were denied. I have also tried to obtain opening
dates from local newspapers, but only succeeded in a handful of cases.
7Vance and Scott [30] list store entries to 1969, the year the company became publicly traded.
8For the years 1990-1993, in which no satisfactory store list allowing identiﬁcation of Wal-Mart stores in a city
exists (the Directory of Discount Department Stores was not updated during those years), I assign opening dates
to stores according to a probabilistic algorithm that uses information on the number of stores opening in each
state each year. State-level data are obtained from Wal-Mart annual reports [31]. This procedure is detailed in
Basker [3], Appendix 1.
6of WMopenjt have to be imputed for the year of entry. I obtain the empirical distribution
of entry dates over the year from Wal-Mart’s web site, which provides exact opening dates for
all store openings over the three-year period July 2001 - June 2004. (Quarterly probabilities
are approximately 29%, 26%, 26%, and 19%.) So, for a store that opened in 1986, I assign the
variable WMopen a value of 0 up to and including the ﬁrst quarter of 1986 (since the ﬁrst-
quarter observation gives prices in the ﬁrst week of January), 0.29 in the second quarter, 0.55
in the third quarter, 0.81 in the fourth quarter, and 1 from the ﬁrst quarter of 1987 onwards.9
I also construct a set of identiﬁers of Wal-Mart planned entry dates, using a combination
of company-assigned store numbers (available from the Rand McNally atlases) and the net
change in the number of stores each year (from company annual reports). Wal-Mart assigns
store numbers roughly in sequential order, with store #1 opening ﬁrst, followed by store #2,
and so on; store numbers appear to be assigned early in the store planning process. Following
this practice, I assign planned entry dates to stores sequentially, based on their store numbers,
holding ﬁxed (at actual levels) the total number of new stores to open each year. For example,
since there were 18 stores at the end of 1969, and 20 new stores opened in 1970, I assign 20
stores (numbers 19-38) the planned entry year 1970. This assignment assumes that the number
of planned entries in 1970 was the same as the actual number of entries that year.
Within a calendar year, I assign the ﬁrst 29% of stores to the ﬁrst quarter (so they are
assumed to be open by the second quarter), the next 26% to the second quarter, another 26%
to the third quarter, and the remainder to the fourth quarter (so they are open by the ﬁrst
quarter of the following year).
This assignment method provides a good approximation to the likely order in which the
stores were planned. Aggregating these store-level entry dates to the city-quarter level, I con-
struct the indicator variable WMplanjt, which equals 1 if city j would have had a Wal-Mart
store in quarter t had the stores opened in the order in which they were planned. In the most
speciﬁcations below, I use only the opening dates (both WMopen and WMplan) for the ﬁrst
Wal-Mart store to open in each city, but I also estimate two models that try to get at the eﬀect
of subsequent Wal-Mart entries.10
9The resulting variable WMopenjt is equal to either 0 or 1 in 96% of the observations. Most of the ob-
servations in which WMopenjt takes on values strictly between 0 and 1, representing the probability that a
Wal-Mart store exists, occur during the years (1990-1993) when store directories were not updated (see footnote
8). Replacing this imputation with an indicator variable which equals 1 if the probability of a Wal-Mart store
exceeds 50%, and zero otherwise, does not meaningfully change any of the results in the paper.




















Aspirin 100-tablet bottle, Bayer brand (to 1994:3) $ 4.96
0.5oz Polysporin ointment (from 1994:4) $ 4.56
Cigarettes Carton, Winston, king-size (85mm.) $19.69
Coke 2-liter Coca Cola, excluding deposit $ 1.56
Detergent 49oz Tide/Bold/Cheer laundry detergent (to 1991:3) $ 3.39
42oz Tide/Bold/Cheer laundry detergent (1991:4-1996:3) $ 3.97
60oz Cascade dish washing powder (from 1996:4) $ 3.02
Kleenex 200-count Kleenex tissues (to 1983:4) $ 1.46
175-count Kleenex tissues (from 1984:1) $ 1.34
Shampoo 11oz bottle, Johnsons Baby Shampoo (to 1991:2) $ 4.21
15oz Alberto VO5 (from 1991:3) $ 1.29








g Shirt Mans dress shirt, Arrow $30.19
Pants Levis 501/505 jeans, rinsed/washed/bleached size 28-36 (to 1999:4) $33.28
Mens Dockers “no wrinkle” khakis size 28-36 (from 2000:1) $35.72
Underwear 3 boys cotton briefs, Fruit of the Loom (to 1983:4) $ 7.29
3 boys cotton briefs, size 10-14, cheapest brand (from 1984:1) $ 5.36
∗ Average price over entire sample period in 2000 dollars
Table 2: Directory Sources for Wal-Mart Opening Dates
Years Source
1962-1969 Vance and Scott (1994)
1970-1978 Wal-Mart Annual Reports
1979-1982 Directory of Discount Department Stores
1983-1986 Directory of Discount Stores
1987-1989 Directory of Discount Department Stores
1990-1993 Imputed (see footnote 8)
1994-1997 Rand McNally Road Atlas
83.3 Sample Cities
The sample cities, determined by price-data availability, are shown in Figure 2, and some
summary statistics are shown in Table 3. The average city in the sample had approximately
200,000 residents in 2000 (the median city had approximately half as many residents). The
large apparent decrease in the number of establishments between 1987 and 1997 is due to a
change in Census industrial coding from SIC to NAICS. (More information about the switch
from SIC to NAICS is available at http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naics.html.11) The
right-skew implied by deviation between median and mean is comparable to the one obtained
from a census of US cities.
Of the 165 sample cities, 25 had at least one Wal-Mart store at the beginning of the sample
period. All but three cities (Denver, South Bend, and Tacoma) had experienced entry by the
end of the sample period, and three cities experienced exit.
4 Empirical Methodology
4.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regressions
I estimate the following regression by product:










τkjtrendt + εkjt (1)
where pkjt is the natural log of the price of product k in city j in quarter t, quartert is a
quarter indicator (where t ranges from 1982q2 to 2002q4 – a total of 83 quarter indicators),
cityj is a city indicator, trendt is a linear trend (with coeﬃcient τkj, which is speciﬁc to city
j) and WMopenjt is the Wal-Mart indicator: it equals 1 if city j has a Wal-Mart store in
quarter t. (From now on, I suppress the k subscript; it is always implied, since the regressions
are estimated one product at a time.)
The quarter ﬁxed eﬀects are intended to capture macroeconomics price ﬂuctuations, changes
in product deﬁnitions or cost of production that are common across all cities. City ﬁxed eﬀects
This was done in a previous version of the paper, with qualitatively similar results.
11Wal-Mart entry does not lead to sharp decreases in the number of retail establishments; on average at the
county level, 5 retail establishments close within 5 years of Wal-Mart entry (Basker [3]).
9Figure 2: Locations of Sample Cities
Table 3: Sample Cities Summary Statistics
Percentiles
Mean 25th 50th 75th
Population (1980) 164,322 40,450 71,626 172,140
Population (1990) 179,344 44,972 84,021 187,217
Population (2000) 199,797 52,894 91,565 217,074
Retail Establishments, SIC (1982)∗ 1,780 537 906 1,736
Retail Establishments, SIC (1987)∗∗ 2,132 641 1,069 2,069
Retail Establishments, NAICS (1997)† 1,037 373 515 1,106
Per-Capita Income (1979)‡ 16,640 15,041 16,351 17,810
Per-Capita Income (1989)‡ 17,911 16,052 17,346 19,592
Source: Author’s calculations from County and City Data Book, Various Years
∗ Mean calculated using only 142 of 165 cities; percentiles include all cities
∗∗ Mean calculated using only 145 of 165 cities; percentiles include all cities
† Mean calculated using only 146 of 165 cities; percentiles include all cities
‡ Real 2000 dollars
10capture average (long-run) price diﬀerences across cities, for example due to diﬀerential land
or labor costs. City-speciﬁc time trends capture changes over time in relative prices for various
exogenous reasons: trends in average income, income inequality, land and labor costs, and the
level of competition.12 If Wal-Mart entry is correlated with the sign and degree of these trends
– for example, if Wal-Mart enters cities with declining prices earlier (or later) than cities with
rising prices – the estimated coeﬃcient will be biased in regressions that omit this trend. (City-
level time trends are jointly extremely statistically signiﬁcant; F statistics are almost always
above 10,000.) Put together, these control variables capture three things: average diﬀerences
in prices across cities; diﬀerent trends in prices across cities; and macroeconomic shocks, as well
as changes in product deﬁnitions, that shift these trends.
The coeﬃcient on lagged price, β, is a relative “stickiness” parameter, indicating to what
extent relative prices in city j in quarter t – adjusting for diﬀerences in their long-run trends
– are unchanged from one quarter to the next. If β = 0, then the price (of shampoo or
cigarettes or laundry detergent) in city j in quarter t is an i.i.d. draw, with expected value
that depends only on city j’s price trend, and any aggregate factors captured by the calendar
quarter (and possibly the presence of Wal-Mart). If β > 0, however, deviations of price from
this deterministic path last more than just one quarter, so that last period’s price of a product
has predictive power for this period’s price. The interpretation of the coeﬃcients on the city
ﬁxed eﬀects and the city-speciﬁc trends depends critically on having β < 1, i.e., on the price
series being stationary. My estimates of β vary by product and speciﬁcation, but mostly lie in
the interval [0.7,0.8].13 Thus, β captures the fact that price deviations from a city’s “trending
average” (relative to all other cities in the sample) last more than one period, but decay over
time.
The coeﬃcient θ captures the instantaneous eﬀect of Wal-Mart entry on prices. Assuming,
for expositional purposes, that θ < 0 and β < 1, if prices fall by θ in the quarter of entry,
there will be an additional eﬀect of βθ the following quarter, as lagged prices are now θ lower
than they were before; and an additional β2θ the following quarter. The long-run (asymptotic)
eﬀect of Wal-Mart entry on prices is θ
1−β.14 I estimate both the instantaneous and asymptotic
12The inclusion of both city ﬁxed eﬀects and city-speciﬁc trends allows the average price in each city to take
a separate (linear) path. This is a reduced-form way of controlling for variables that change at low frequencies
(like income and population) without including them directly.
13Parsley and Wei [23] use ACCRA price data for 48 cities over the period 1975-1994 and ﬁnd strong evidence
against unit roots in prices, and in favor of price convergence.
14As with the city-level coeﬃcients, this expression depends critically on β < 1. As note above, this condition
11eﬀects, and separately test for their signiﬁcance. (I use a Wald test for the non-linear test.)
Figure 3 illustrates the interpretation of the coeﬃcients. Wal-Mart entry occurs at time
t0. The ﬁrst panel shows the case with no price trends; the second and third panels show that
the interpretation of the coeﬃcients does not change when city-speciﬁc linear time trends are
included in the model.
Because the short- and long-run eﬀects estimated by these models are mechanically related
(through the coeﬃcient β), I also test to see whether there is an additional long-run eﬀect of
Wal-Mart. This could occur for several reasons: as some incumbents exit following Wal-Mart’s
entry, the remaining stores’ prices may increase over time; alternatively, they may decrease if
consumers are relatively unresponsive to price diﬀerences across locations in the short-run, but
become more responsive over time. I allow a two-step adjustment process to Wal-Mart entry:
an instantaneous eﬀect θ, and a second eﬀect φ ﬁve years (20 quarters) later:15










τjtrendtj + εjt (2)
Figure 4 shows this speciﬁcation graphically, with θ and φ “price shocks” T periods apart.
(For simplicity, trends are omitted from the ﬁgures.) The long-run eﬀect is given by
θ+φ·βT+1
1−β .
Depending on the relative magnitudes of θ and φ, and on the sharpness of “discounting” implied
by β, the long-run eﬀect may be larger or smaller than the short-run eﬀect of Wal-Mart, and
may even be of the opposite sign (as in the second panel). This is in contrast with estimates
from Equation (1) in which, as long as β < 1, long-run estimates are always of the same sign
as short-run eﬀects, and always larger in absolute terms.
4.2 Measurement Error in Prices
ACCRA price data are subject to measurement error, as discussed in Section 3.1. If price were
only on the left-hand side of the regression, measurement error would increase the variance of
the error term without aﬀecting any coeﬃcient estimates. But both speciﬁcations (1) and (2)
include lagged price on the right-hand side of the regression, to account for the fact that prices
holds for all speciﬁcations.
15The choice of a ﬁve-year window is arbitrary, but Basker [3] shows that within ﬁve years the retail sector





T+1)/( 1 - β)
T 
t





T+1)/( 1 - β)
t
t0  t1 
θ
(Θ+φ·β




t0  t1 
















T+1)/( 1 - β)
T 
t





T+1)/( 1 - β)
t
t0  t1 
θ
(Θ+φ·β




t0  t1 











Figure 4: Interpreting Regression Coeﬃcients with Two Wal-Mart Coeﬃcients
14move slowly, and do not return to their expected (trend-adjusted) level for several quarters
following any “shock”.
In the presence of measurement error in prices, the estimate of β is attenuated (biased
towards zero), and other point estimates, including the estimate of θ, are also biased. If the
measurement error is solely, or primarily, due to errors in the process of collecting prices – e.g.,
writing down a price of 0.79 when the true price is 0.97 – so that the errors are uncorrelated over
time, we can address this problem by using pkj,t−2, the second lag of price, to instrument for
pkj,t−1. Unless otherwise noted, all the estimates shown below use this IV strategy to eliminate
(or at least reduce) the problem of measurement error.
If measurement error is due to other causes – such as non-representative selection of retail
establishments in the price survey – twice-lagged price may not be a valid instrument. For this
reason I experiment with a functional form that omits lagged price:16









τjtrendt + εjt (3)
Including lagged prices on the right-hand side of the regression is problematic for another
reason: lagged price may be endogenous. Endogeneity of lagged price could arise because the
error term εjt is not i.i.d. – for example if it follows an AR or MA process – in which case, the
error term and lagged price will be correlated. Like measurement error, endogeneity of lagged
price would also yield biased estimates of Wal-Mart’s eﬀect in these regressions.17
Instrumenting for lagged price with twice-lagged price, as described above, is a valid cor-
rection for endogeneity under some – but not all – conditions. Speciﬁcally, if the error term is
MA(1), an IV speciﬁcation would be valid; but if the error term is AR(1), it would not: in that
case twice-lagged price (as well as any longer lag) would still be correlated with the error term.
The alternative speciﬁcation with no lagged price may be preferable under these conditions.
(A completely exogenous instrument would be the best solution to this problem, but none is
available, as noted in footnote 16.) While neither speciﬁcation is perfect, taken together, the
16There is no available alternative instrument for lagged price. A valid instrument needs to be correlated with
last quarter’s average price of a given good in a city, after controlling for all the covariates, but be uncorrelated
with the error in measurement of lagged price.
17The same problem would result if there is an omitted determinant of price, which is correlated with lagged
price, and is not captured by any of the other regressors in the model. (A possible example could be entry of
another large retailer, if it depresses prices.) Since the regression includes both city and time (quarter) ﬁxed
eﬀects, to induce bias, this omitted variable must vary across both time and cities, and not follow a linear trend
at the city level.
15two speciﬁcations tell a more complete story than either one tells alone.
4.3 Measurement Error in Wal-Mart Data
I use instrumental-variables estimates to correct for two problems in the Wal-Mart variable:
measurement error and endogeneity. Inaccuracies in the directories and store lists, combined
with the probabilistic method of assigning opening dates across quarters (and across years
over the period 1990-1993), lead to measurement error in the variable WMopenjt, causing
attenuation bias in estimates of θ. Endogeneity may also a problem, even after controlling for
city-level trends, if Wal-Mart entry is more likely in times of high (or low) prices, relative to
the city’s long-run trend. In that case, mean reversion alone will cause prices to fall (rise), and
the estimated coeﬃcient θ may be spuriously negative (positive).
Measurement error in the Wal-Mart entry variable WMopenjt takes a particular form:
while the entered cities are correctly identiﬁed, the timing of entry may be incorrectly measured
due to errors in the directories. The variable WMplanjt is also measured with error, by
construction: it represents the number of stores that would be open had stores always opened
in the order in which they were planned, with the total number of stores opening each year is
held at its actual level, and the distribution of opening dates across quarters assumed constant
– at 2001-04 levels – over the 20 year period.
As long as the measurement errors in the two variables is classical and uncorrelated, we can
use WMplanjt to instrument for WMopenjt. The second assumption appears to be correct;
it would be violated if, for example, stores in rural areas are completed faster than stores in
urban areas and also appear later in directories, but this does not appear to be the case.18
But measurement error is not classical: the actual number of Wal-Mart stores in city j in
quarter t diﬀers from the measured number by a number whose expected value is correlated
with the measured number. (For example, when the directories report zero Wal-Marts in town,
the expected number of stores is some (small) positive number. When the reported number of
Wal-Marts is one, the actual number is usually either zero or one, so the expected number is
less than one.) This induces a slight bias in the instrumental-variables results reported here.19
18There is no correlation between observable location characteristics and the time lag between the “planning
date” and the opening date of a store.
19Kane, Rouse and Staiger [20] suggest a GMM estimator to address this problem. Unfortunately, due to the
size of the panel, their solution is not computationally feasible in this setting. While the bias could be large in
theory, in the static returns-to-schooling example of Kane, Rouse and Staiger, the bias is approximately 5% of
the IV coeﬃcient estimate. The sign of this bias is indeterminate.
16The ﬁrst-stage regression associated with Equation (1) is
WMopenjt = e α + e βpj,t−1 +
X
t
e δtquartert + e θWMplanjt +
X
j
e τjtrendtj + e εjt.
Although the ﬁrst-stage regression has a binary dependent variable, I estimate the ﬁrst-stage
by Ordinary Least Squares rather than a nonlinear model such as probit or logit. Angrist and
Kreuger [2] caution against using a nonlinear ﬁrst-stage model because, unless it is exactly
right, it will generate inconsistent second-stage coeﬃcients. A ﬁrst-stage OLS speciﬁcation, in
contrast, yields consistent second-stage estimates even if it is not exactly correct.
This IV strategy can also correct for possible endogeneity of Wal-Mart’s entry decision.
Concerns about endogeneity have two dimensions: Wal-Mart may select the cities it enters
non-randomly, and it may choose the timing of entry non-randomly.
The cross-sectional dimension (choice of cities) is very plausible; for example, Wal-Mart
may prefer to enter cities with less-competitive retail markets (hence higher pre-entry prices)
or with a larger fraction of search-savvy lower-middle income families (whose presence leads to
lower average retail prices; see Frankel and Gould [14]). This concern is greatly mitigated by
the fact that Wal-Mart entry is observed in 162 of the 165 sample cities, and the sample cities
are diverse with respect to all standard economic and demographic variables (see Table 3).
The timing dimension is important if Wal-Mart can schedule its entry to coincide with high
retail prices. Under reasonable assumptions, using WMplanjt to instrument for WMopenjt
can correct not only for measurement error but also for endogeneity in the timing of entry. Of
course, if there are omitted variables – if Wal-Mart’s entry is correlated with other shocks to the
local retail market, such as the entry or exit of other stores – in which case OLS estimates may
confound Wal-Mart’s eﬀect with price changes that happen for other reasons. (Any omitted
city-speciﬁc variable that is either unchanged over this period, or moves linearly, will be captured
by the city ﬁxed eﬀects and/or the city-speciﬁc trends in the model.)
The identiﬁcation strategy assumes that Wal-Mart plans its store entries well in advance
of entry and cannot accurately forecast exact market conditions (prices) at the time for which
entry is planned. This assumption seems reasonable: it can take a year, and often longer, to
get a property zoned, acquire all the necessary building permits, build and open a store for
business. While Wal-Mart may want to enter any market at a time when prices are relatively
high – when potential proﬁts, as well as apparent beneﬁt to consumers, are highest – it cannot
17predict the timing of high prices with any accuracy if the delay between planning and entry is
long enough. The company may ﬁne-tune opening dates based on current market conditions,
but if the planning occurs suﬃciently in advance – and prices are suﬃciently ﬂexible – then
planning dates can be treated as exogenous to retail prices at the time of Wal-Mart entry. So,
while the actual date of entry may be manipulated – moved forwards or delayed – to correspond
with “favorable” (high) price conditions, the planned date of entry will be largely free of those
biases, at least once we account for long-run diﬀerences in average prices across cities.20
5 Results
5.1 OLS Results
Before proceeding to the IV results, I show some results from OLS regressions of Equation (1).
Unless otherwise noted, the speciﬁcations below use twice-lagged price as an instrument for
lagged price; I use the term “OLS” to mean that the Wal-Mart variable, WMopenjt, is not
instrumented.
Table 4 shows results from 10 separate OLS regressions. Each row represents a separate
regression, and shows the estimated coeﬃcients θ (the instantaneous eﬀect of Wal-Mart entry)
and β (the mean-reversion/price stickiness parameter), as well as the estimated long-run eﬀect
of entry, θ
1−β. Signiﬁcance levels for the latter are given by the p-value from a (two-sided) Wald
test for H0 : θ
1−β = 0. So, for example, the average price of detergent is estimated to decline by
0.78% in the quarter following Wal-Mart entry, and reach a decline of 3.86% asymptotically.
OLS estimates of the price eﬀect of Wal-Mart are negative for 9 of the 10 products (cigarettes
are the exception), and signiﬁcant for three products – detergent, shampoo and toothpaste
(although the latter is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level). For these three products, the estimated
short-run eﬀect has a magnitude of 0.7-0.8%, and the long-run magnitude of 3.5-4%.
The distinction between short- and long-run eﬀects of Wal-Mart depend on the inclusion of
20A possible exception to this argument is if Wal-Mart’s entry is correlated with the entry (or exit) of other
ﬁrms. If both the planning and the implementation of Wal-Mart entry coincides with that of other retailers –
for example, if entry tends to be associated with the building of new “strip malls” that bring additional stores
– coeﬃcient estimates of the impact of Wal-Mart incorporate the impact of the ancillary entries. By attributing
the joint causal eﬀect to Wal-Mart, we are assuming that the ancillary entries would not have occurred without
Wal-Mart’s. If this assumption is invalid – that is, if other entries occur independently of, but concurrently with,
Wal-Mart’s – the IV strategy described here would no longer be valid. Anecdotal evidence suggests that other
stores enter (and exit) in response to Wal-Mart, so that the instrument is valid. Unfortunately, data on the
timing of entry of other large retailers are not available, so I cannot control directly for these.
18lagged price in the regression, and on the validity of the IV correction for measurement error
in lagged price (and possibly for endogeneity as well). If lagged price is omitted from these
regressions, the estimated eﬀect of Wal-Mart (not shown) is negative for 8 of the 10 products,
and statistically diﬀerent from zero in four cases. The statistically-signiﬁcant coeﬃcients range
from a 2.2% estimated decline in the price of shampoo (signiﬁcant at the 10% conﬁdence level)
to a 3.6% estimated decline in the price of detergent (signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level).
5.2 IV Results
Table 5 show instrumental variables estimates corresponding to Table 4. As expected where
measurement error is present, almost all point estimates of θ are (absolutely) larger than the
OLS estimates. Point estimates of Wal-Mart’s eﬀect show statistically signiﬁcant short-run
declines of 1.5-3% in the prices of aspirin, detergent, Kleenex and toothpaste (with long-run
declines of 8-13%), and marginally signiﬁcant declines, with similar magnitudes, for shampoo.
Only estimates of Wal-Mart’s impact on the prices of cigarettes and pants are positive, and
neither is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Table 6 shows IV estimates of Equation (3), which omits the lagged price variable. Qual-
itatively, the results are extremely similar to the results in Table 5. The point estimates of θ
lie between the short- and long-run point estimates from the full model, near their midpoint.
Since results are qualitatively similar, we can infer that uncorrected endogeneity of lagged price
is not seriously biasing the estimates of Wal-Mart’s impact. In these speciﬁcations, the test
statistic for joint signiﬁcance of the city-level trends increases by a factor of 10 or more, exceed-
ing 500,000 for all regressions (and reaching 50,000,000 for cigarettes); this suggests that there
is a strong relationship between price observations one quarter apart. The model with lagged
price captures this relationship explicitly. It also allows us to distinguish between the short-
and long-run eﬀects of entry, which this restricted model does not.
Table 7 shows IV estimates of Equation (2), which allows for diﬀerent eﬀects of Wal-Mart
on prices in the short- and medium-runs (up to ﬁve years after entry) and the long-run. The
coeﬃcient φ represents the additional (positive or negative) change in price ﬁve years after
Wal-Mart entry. Estimates of φ are generally small relative to θ; it is positive, large (2%) and
signiﬁcant for one product (toothpaste). With this one exception, the estimates are broadly
similar to the ones shown in Table 5, in which only a single coeﬃcient was estimated. Long-run
eﬀects are negative for all products except underwear.
19Table 4: OLS Estimates
Product θ β θ
1−β
a
Aspirin -0.0025 0.7721*** -0.0111
(0.0041) (0.0189)
........................................................................
Cigarettes 0.0015 0.8350*** 0.009
(0.0014) (0.0153)
........................................................................
Coke -0.0035 0.7981*** -0.0175
(0.0039) (0.0416)
........................................................................
Detergent -0.0083*** 0.7946*** -0.0406***
(0.0032) (0.0206)
........................................................................
Kleenex -0.0030 0.8043*** -0.0152
(0.0024) (0.0248)
........................................................................
Pants -0.0038 0.7556*** -0.0156
(0.0040) (0.0238)
........................................................................
Shampoo -0.0090** 0.7932*** -0.0437**
(0.0035) (0.0232)
........................................................................
Shirt -0.0057 0.7194*** -0.0203
(0.0045) (0.0269)
........................................................................
Toothpaste -0.0067* 0.7899*** -0.0319*
(0.0040) (0.0225)
........................................................................
Underwear 0.0006 0.7575*** 0.0026
(0.0057) (0.0235)
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by city)
Regressions include city and quarter FE and city-speciﬁc price trends;
F statistics from joint test for city level trends range form 20,000-250,000
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
a Signiﬁcance level from Wald test for H0 : θ
1−β = 0
20Table 5: IV Estimates
Product θ β θ
1−β
a
Aspirin -0.0244** 0.7685*** -0.1053**
(0.0114) (0.0197)
........................................................................
Cigarettes 0.0019 0.8349*** 0.0112
(0.0034) (0.0153)
........................................................................
Coke -0.0034 0.7981*** -0.0169
(0.0092) (0.0415)
........................................................................
Detergent -0.0193** 0.7904*** -0.0920**
(0.0085) (0.0211)
........................................................................
Kleenex -0.0156** 0.8015*** -0.0786**
(0.0064) (0.0247)
........................................................................
Pants 0.0015 0.7570*** 0.0062
(0.0108) (0.0232)
........................................................................
Shampoo -0.0163* 0.7920*** -0.0784*
(0.0093) (0.0233)
........................................................................
Shirt -0.0008 0.7191*** -0.0028
(0.0109) (0.0271)
........................................................................
Toothpaste -0.0286** 0.7846*** -0.1327***
(0.0111) (0.0228)
........................................................................
Underwear -0.0016 0.7575*** -0.0065
(0.0142) (0.0235)
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by city)
Regressions include city and quarter FE and city-speciﬁc price trends
F statistics from joint test for city level trends range from 25,000-450,000
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
a Signiﬁcance level from Wald test for H0 : θ
1−β = 0
21This ﬁnding eﬀectively rules out many possible scenarios, among them the possibility that,
while Wal-Mart’s entry initially lowers prices, prices rise again once competitors are driven out
of the market. Instead, Wal-Mart entry is associated with one relatively large price shock,
which reverberates through the auto-regressive component.21
5.3 Diﬀerential Impact of First and Later Entries
In the preceding regressions, I consider only the eﬀect of the ﬁrst Wal-Mart store to enter a
city. But many cities have more than one Wal-Mart store. In 43% of sample cities – 70 of
164 – two or more store were open by the end of the sample period. (Of these, 36 cities had
two stores, and 14 had three. One city – Houston – had nine stores by the end of the sample
period.)
To test whether the second Wal-Mart store has the same eﬀect as the ﬁrst, I estimate










τjtrendtj + εjt (4)
where WMopenjt is as deﬁned above, and WMopen2jt equals 1 if there are at least two stores
in city j in quarter t.22 Estimating θ1 and θ2 separately allows us to test directly whether the
second store has the same impact as the ﬁrst.
Estimation results are shown in Table 8. First-store eﬀects are all of the same sign as in the
baseline speciﬁcation (Table 5, with the statistically-signiﬁcant eﬀects (for aspirin, detergent,
Kleenex, shampoo and toothpaste) all negative, larger in absolute terms than in the baseline
speciﬁcation. The eﬀect of the second store varies by product; it is generally of a similar
magnitude, but opposite sign, to the ﬁrst store’s eﬀect. In the case of aspirin and toothpaste,
it is positive and statistically signiﬁcant (at 5% and 1%, respectively).
Since θ1 estimates a once-and-for-all eﬀect, the joint (cumulative) eﬀect of the ﬁrst and
second stores is a function of both parameters. To a ﬁrst approximation (ignoring the time lag
between the ﬁrst and second store openings), the joint eﬀect of two stores is the sum of the
two coeﬃcients θ1 and θ2. (The average lag between the ﬁrst and second store openings in my
21Estimates of this speciﬁcation without lagged price are qualitatively similar, but magnitudes of the long-run
eﬀect, speciﬁed as θ + φ, are slightly smaller in absolute terms.
22I also deﬁne WMplan2jt, which equals 1 if at least two Wal-Mart stores were planned to have opened in
city j by quarter t, and use it as an instrument along with WMplanjt.
22sample, for cities with more than one store, is three years.) This sum is generally very small,
and tends to be negative but statistically insigniﬁcant.
In speciﬁcations omitting the lagged dependent variable, estimates of both θ1 and θ2 are
larger. The sum θ1 + θ2 is statistically diﬀerent from zero for two products – detergent and
Kleenex (at 10% and 5% signiﬁcance, respectively); in both cases the sum is negative.
I also estimate a model in which the eﬀect of Wal-Mart is linear in the number of stores:









τjtrendtj + εjt (5)
where WMsopenjt is the number (0-10) of Wal-Mart stores open in city j in quarter t (and
WMsplanjt, the number of Wal-Mart stores planned to have opened in city j by quarter t,
serves as the instrument). Across all products, estimated θ coeﬃcients (not shown) are small
(below 0.5% in absolute terms), and statistically indistinguishable from zero; seven of the ten
are negative.
5.4 City Size Eﬀect
In this section, I test the hypothesis that Wal-Mart’s eﬀect will be larger in cities with less
competitive retail markets. Bresnahan and Reiss [4] and Campbell and Hopenhayn [5], among
others, note that most models of imperfect competition predict smaller cities will have less
competitive retail markets, but this prediction has been hard to test empirically.
There is not a single obvious measure of city size. The number of retail establishments in a
city is strongly correlated with population size; in my sample, the correlation coeﬃcient between
the 1980 city population and the number of retail establishments the city had in 1982 is 0.98.
The number of establishments does not increase one-to-one with population, however; larger
cities tend to have a larger absolute number of retail establishments, but fewer establishments
per capita. Small cities have disproportionately many small stores (Campbell and Hopenhayn
[5]), which are likely to be less eﬃcient – and more expensive.23
In Figure 5 I plot the number of retail establishments in 1982 against the number of re-
tail establishments per capita.24 Outlier cities are individually labeled. The ﬁgure highlights
23Dinlersoz [10] notes another diﬀerence between the organization of retail markets in small and large cities:
larger cities have relatively fewer chain stores and more stand-alone stores, which are likely to behave more
competitively. Counts of chains and stand-alone stores are not available for my sample.
24Only the 142 sample cities with 1980 population above 25,000 are included in the ﬁgure. I use the 1980 Census
23Table 6: IV Estimates without Lagged Price
Product θ Product θ
Aspirin -0.0666* Pants 0.0274
(0.0341) (0.0318)
...................................................................
Cigarettes 0.0153 Shampoo -0.0362
(0.0119) (0.0250)
...................................................................
Coke 0.0110 Shirt 0.0194
(0.0282) (0.0291)
...................................................................
Detergent -0.0589** Toothpaste -0.0863***
(0.0274) (0.0310)
...................................................................
Kleenex -0.0325 Underwear -0.0058
(0.0205) (0.0404)
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by city)
Regressions include city and quarter FE and city-speciﬁc price
trends; F statistics from joint test for city level trends exceed
500,000 in all regressions
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Figure 5: Total Retail Establishments vs. Establishments per Capita (1982)
24Table 7: IV Estimates with Diﬀerent Short- and Long-Run Eﬀects




Aspirin -0.0235** 0.0011 0.7685*** -0.1016**
(0.0103) (0.0081) (0.0198)
........................................................................
Cigarettes -0.0001 -0.0030 0.8359*** -0.0013
(0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0159)
........................................................................
Coke -0.0011 0.0032 0.7958*** -0.0051
(0.0084) (0.0067) (0.0419)
........................................................................
Detergent -0.0148* 0.0062 0.7979*** -0.0728**
(0.0077) (0.0053) (0.0213)
........................................................................
Kleenex -0.0129** 0.0040 0.8001*** -0.0645**
(0.0061) (0.0033) (0.0246)
........................................................................
Pants -0.0056 -0.0109 0.7503*** -0.0226
(0.0101) (0.0070) (0.0249)
........................................................................
Shampoo -0.0180** -0.0028 0.7888*** -0.0854**
(0.0087) (0.0068) (0.0233)
........................................................................
Shirt -0.0009 -0.0002 0.7191*** -0.0034
(0.0103) (0.0078) (0.0272)
........................................................................
Toothpaste -0.0147 0.0203*** 0.7883*** -0.0689
(0.0094) (0.0073) (0.0229)
........................................................................
Underwear 0.0012 0.0043 0.7565*** 0.0051
(0.0125) (0.0090) (0.0237)
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by city)
Regressions include city and quarter FE and city-speciﬁc price trends;
F statistics from joint test for city level trends range from 25,000-120,000
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
a Signiﬁcance level from Wald test for H0 :
θ+φ·β21
1−β = 0
25Table 8: IV Estimates with Diﬀerent First- and Second-Store Eﬀects
Product θ1 θ2 β
Aspirin -0.0355** 0.0382** 0.7660***
(0.0153) (0.0182) (0.0202)
........................................................................
Cigarettes 0.0033 -0.0050 0.8336***
(0.0045) (0.0055) (0.0159)
........................................................................
Coke -0.0051 0.0057 0.7983***
(0.0124) (0.0167) (0.0415)
........................................................................
Detergent -0.0249** 0.0199 0.7899***
(0.0108) (0.0133) (0.0213)
........................................................................
Kleenex -0.0204** 0.0171 0.8032***
(0.0084) (0.0107) (0.0246)
........................................................................
Pants 0.0037 -0.0078 0.7579***
(0.0137) (0.0162) (0.0232)
........................................................................
Shampoo -0.0209* 0.0161 0.7921***
(0.0121) (0.0148) (0.0234)
........................................................................
Shirt -0.0075 0.0237 0.7164***
(0.0147) (0.0203) (0.0268)
........................................................................
Toothpaste -0.0453*** 0.0566*** 0.7787***
(0.0166) (0.0209) (0.0236)
........................................................................
Underwear -0.0040 0.0085 0.7568***
(0.0176) (0.0226) (0.0235)
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by city)
Regressions include city and quarter FE and city-speciﬁc price trends;
F statistics from joint test for city level trends range from 40,000-500,000
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
26the strong negative relationship between the number of retail establishments and their number
relative to population (the correlation coeﬃcient is -0.37): Grand Junction, Colorado (1980
population: 28,000) has the highest number of retail establishments per capita, while Philadel-
phia (1980 population: 1.7m) has the second-lowest (the lowest is in New Orleans, with 1980
population of 560,000). The horizontal line at 0.0111 indicates the median for this sample.
While establishment breakdowns are not available at the city level, approximately 10% of
retail establishments in the US in 1982 were clothing stores (SIC 5600) and 3.8% of retail
establishments were “drug stores and proprietary stores” (SIC 5910). (Both fractions declined
over the 1980s and 1990s, each by approximately one percentage point.) Therefore, a city with
987 retail establishments (the median in my sample in 1982) had approximately 37 drugstores
– well within the intermediate range (between quintopolies and urban markets) considered by
Bresnahan and Reiss [4].
I estimate










τjtrendtj + εjt (6)
where low and high are indicator variables for cities with number of retail establishments per
capita in 1982 below and above the median (0.0111), respectively.
Table 9 shows estimates of the coeﬃcients of interest, θ1, θ2, and β. For nine of the ten
products, θ2 is estimated to be negative (and statistically diﬀerent from zero), with Wal-Mart’s
short-run eﬀects estimated to be between 2-4%; θ1 is never statistically diﬀerent from zero.
The diﬀerence between these coeﬃcients is statistically signiﬁcant for shampoo at the 10%
signiﬁcance level, for shirt at the 5% signiﬁcance level, and for detergent and Coke at the 1%
level. Long-run eﬀects are magniﬁed by β, and range from 10-20% for small cities (cities with
many retail establishments per capita); long-run eﬀects for large cities (with few establishments
per capita) are never statistically diﬀerent from zero.25
population, rather than 1982 population estimates, to compute the per-capita number of retail establishments.
25When lagged price is omitted from the regressions, estimates of θ1 are negative for 6 of the 10 products,
and estimates of θ2 are negative for 7 of the 10 products. In contrast to the main speciﬁcation, however, θ2 is
statistically signiﬁcant in only three cases: for detergent, the estimated price decline for cities with many retail
establishments per capita is 11% (signiﬁcant at the 1% level); for toothpaste, it is 9.5% (signiﬁcant at the 5%
level) and for shampoo, it is 6% (signiﬁcant at the 10% level). The estimate of θ1 is signiﬁcant (at the 10% level)
in one case, for the price of a shirt, where it implies a price increase of 6% due to Wal-Mart entry.
27As a robustness check, I also estimate a model in which I interact the number of retail
establishments per capita in 1982 (a continuous variable) with the Wal-Mart variable. (The
equation also includes a main Wal-Mart eﬀect; city ﬁxed eﬀects prevent estimation of a main
1982-establishments-per-capita eﬀect.) The interaction term is negative in 9 of 10 regressions
(not shown), again indicating that Wal-Mart’s negative price eﬀect is larger in cities with many
establishments per capita. For three products – Coke, shampoo, and shirt – the interaction
term is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level; and it is signiﬁcant at the 5% level for detergent.
Interestingly, when I separate the cities in the sample into “small” and “large” using alter-
native criteria – such as 1980 city population, or 1982 absolute number of retail establishments
– the two coeﬃcients (θ1 and θ2) are never statistically diﬀerent from one another.26 This sug-
gests that the number of establishments per capita may be a better measure of competitiveness
than the absolute number of retail establishments in a city. However, the strong correlation
between population, absolute number of retail establishments, and number of establishments
per capita prevents us from drawing any deﬁnitive conclusions on the main cause of the vari-
ation in Wal-Mart’s impact: when I allow for simultaneous interactions of Wal-Mart entry
with log population and retail establishments per capita, none of the interaction coeﬃcients are
statistically diﬀerent from zero.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper tests the hypothesis that Wal-Mart entry leads to lower average retail prices in the
markets it enters. Using a unique panel data set that combines average retail prices for 10
speciﬁc goods and a complete time-series of Wal-Mart store locations, I estimate the eﬀect of
Wal-Mart entry on prices. I ﬁnd that for many items typically sold in drugstores, such as aspirin
and shampoo, average prices decline following Wal-Mart entry. This decline is economically
large – 1.5-3% in the short run, and four times as much in the long run – and statistically
signiﬁcant.
These ﬁndings are in line with other price surveys. In April 2002 UBS Warburg collected
prices of 100 grocery and non-grocery items in 4-5 grocery stores in each of four large markets:
Sacramento, a city with no Wal-Mart presence; and Las Vegas, Houston and Tampa, each of
26In a model with continuous interaction term with log population, Wal-Mart’s eﬀect varies very little with
population; only in two cases is the coeﬃcient diﬀerent from zero at the 5% conﬁdence level.
28which had at least one Wal-Mart Supercenter. Their study found that Wal-Mart’s prices were
17-39% lower than competitors’ prices in the three “Wal-Mart cities,” and that average prices
at other grocery stores were 13% lower in the Wal-Mart cities than in Sacramento (Currie
and Jain [9]). I repeated Currie and Jain’s analysis using a subset of 24 drugstore products
from their data set comparable to the ACCRA products: Tylenol, Pepto Bismal, shampoo,
deodorant, feminine hygiene items, soap, toothpaste, detergent and Coke. For these items,
Wal-Mart’s prices were 23% lower on average than competitors’ prices in the Wal-Mart cities.
Competitors’ prices in Wal-Mart cities were lower than Sacramento prices for most, but not all,
items; on average, drugstore prices were 15% lower in Wal-Mart cities. Of course, these numbers
should be interpreted cautiously, due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, the small number
of cities included, and the exclusive reliance of the sample on grocery store prices.
Since ﬁgures on proﬁt margins for Wal-Mart competitors in the entered markets are not
available, I use Census data to assess the economic signiﬁcance of these estimates. The Census
Bureau’s annual series, “Current Business Reports: Annual Benchmark Report for Retail Trade
and Food Services,” provides data on average gross margins (roughly, the retail price markup
over wholesale price) by retail sub-sector from 1986-2001 (U.S. Census Bureau [28] and [29]).
Gross margins do not account for any other costs, such as labor, rent, or capital inputs, and
should not be mistaken for proﬁt margins. Apparel stores have gross margins above 40%
on average, meaning that wholesale costs account for under 60% of the retail prices charged
by apparel stores, on average. Drugstores have margins of 25-30% on average.27 Using this
benchmark, a decline of 5% in the price of some drugstore items can be interpreted as a decline
of 15-20% in the gross margin of drugstores.28
In interpreting the point estimates of Wal-Mart’s eﬀect, several caveats are in order.
First, the average-price eﬀect masks a large amount of intra-market variation in competitive
response to Wal-Mart entry. Because the ACCRA data cannot be disaggregated to the store
27The exact deﬁnition of these industries changes halfway through the sample due to the shift from SIC to
NAICS. For the period 1993-1998, when both SIC and NAICS-based ﬁgures are available, the implied margins
are very similar.
28An alternative, more detailed, benchmark is provided by the University of Chicago Graduate School of
Business study of Dominick’s Finer Foods (DFF) in the Chicago metropolitan area. Over the period 1989-1994,
the GSB collected scanner data, including gross margins, from Dominick’s for thousands of individual items.
These data are available on-line at
http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/kilts/research/db/dominicks/index.shtml
and are described in detail in Peltzman [24] and Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi [8]. Several of the items included
in this analysis are also included in the DFF database. The average gross margin on items classiﬁed as “drugstore
products” in this study is 12%.
29level, it is impossible to estimate the distribution of responses. But theory suggests that stores
selling the closest substitutes to Wal-Mart – for example, those that are located near Wal-Mart,
or that are similar on other dimensions – will have the most elastic price responses to Wal-Mart
entry. Stores located far from Wal-Mart are likely to have very small price responses, because
their clienteles’ cross-price elasticity of demand will be low.
A related problem is that Wal-Mart stores may be included in ACCRA’s surveys. If Wal-
Mart’s prices are lower, on average, than other stores’ (Currie and Jain [9], Hausman and
Leibtag [17]), then it is impossible to distinguish, in my results, between Wal-Mart’s direct
eﬀect on average prices, and the more interesting indirect eﬀect due to competitive pressures
on other stores. ACCRA’s explicit instruction to sample only retailer that cater to the upper
quintile of the income distribution mitigates this concern, because it reduces the probability
that Wal-Mart will be sampled. It also reduces the probability that many of Wal-Mart’s direct
competitors – other discount retailers – will be in the sample. The absence of discount stores
and, more generally, the over-sampling of stores that cater to the upper quintile, biases my
estimates against ﬁnding any eﬀect of Wal-Mart.29
Third, ACCRA weights all establishments equally in computing average prices. If Wal-
Mart’s prices are indeed lower than their competitors’ prices, and consumers respond to Wal-
Mart entry by shifting demand from incumbent establishments to Wal-Mart, the eﬀect on the
unweighted price average, estimated here, will be lower than the eﬀect on the eﬀective average
price paid by consumers (properly weighted). This issue is important, but require additional
data – on quantities purchased – to resolve. 30
Pricing strategies that vary by type of store may bias the result in the opposite direction.
Many drug- and grocery stores use so-called “High-Low” pricing, so that an item alternates
between a high “regular” and a low “sale” price, while Wal-Mart uses “every day low pricing,”
which is lower on average than competitors’ prices but is rarely the lowest price in the market.
For non-perishable goods such as the ones considered in this paper, consumers’ ability to buy in
bulk during sales means that the unweighted average price computed by ACCRA under-weights
sale prices. If Wal-Mart’s entry pushes down the “high” (regular) price charged by incumbents
29This eﬀect is probably strongest for clothing, where there is a wide variance in store attributes, even if the
product is relatively homogeneous. This may explain why my estimates of Wal-Mart’s eﬀect on clothing prices
are consistently nil.
30Hausman and Leibtag [17] raise similar points in their discussion of Wal-Mart’s eﬀect on aggregate inﬂation;
they use household-level scanner data to estimate these biases in the CPI, and ﬁnd them to be quite large.
30but does not aﬀect either the probability of a sale or the sale price, the estimated impact of
Wal-Mart will be much larger than its properly-weighted eﬀect. Quantity data are needed in
order to address this issue as well.
Finally, the products selected by ACCRA are not a random sample. For the purpose of
price comparison across cities, ACCRA selected well-known national brands for its price survey;
these items’ prices may not be representative of “typical” drugstore and clothing prices. If the
diﬀerence between Wal-Mart’s and other stores’ prices is greater for national brands than for
local and “store” brands – perhaps because national brands have higher margins – the estimated
eﬀect of Wal-Mart will be biased away from zero. We do not observe that margins are higher
on national brands in the Dominick’s price data; if anything, the brands considered here have
lower margins than average in their categories (e.g., margins for Colgate and Crest toothpaste
are lower than the average toothpaste margin).
Despite these caveats, the estimated eﬀect of Wal-Mart on the prices of several products
considered here are strong and robust. Wal-Mart’s eﬀect is strongest for products traditionally
sold in drugstores, and weakest, or absent, for cigarettes and Coke (sold in many outlets,
including convenience stores) and clothing. This result is intuitively appealing, since (with the
relatively recent exception of grocery stores) Wal-Mart competes most directly with drugstores.
The estimated eﬀects are also strongest for cities with a large number of retail establishments
per capita, consistent with the intuition that Wal-Mart’s entry brings lower prices to consumers
in relatively small cities, where establishments tend to be smaller, and retail environments less
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